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I.    INTRODUCTION 
When a U.S. warship shot down an enemy fighter plane in a naval 
operation in 1988,1 the fighter plane turned out to be a commercial airliner 
transporting 290 civilians, all of whom died.2  The civilians’ next of kin sued 
the U.S. government on the grounds of negligence.3  The United States 
maintained the matter constituted a political question.4  However, in Koohi 
v. United States,5 the appeals court disagreed and without restraint, said, “the 
federal courts are capable of reviewing military decisions, particularly when 
those decisions cause injury to civilians.  The controlling case is The Paquete 
Habana.”6  The Koohi proposition7 oversimplifies the law.   
 
* Senior Staff Attorney & Senior Program Manager, The Veterans Consortium Pro Bono 
Program; Major, U.S. Marine Corps Reserve; Instructor, Law of War Training Section, Headquarters 
Marine Corps.  LL.M., National Security Law, 2016, Georgetown University Law Center; J.D., 2010, 
Howard University School of Law; B.A. (moral & political philosophy), 2007, University of Cincinnati.  
Admitted to practice law in New York, DC, the U.S. Court of Appeals for Veterans’ Claims, and the 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.  Views expressed are the author’s alone and do not 
represent views of The Veterans Consortium or the Department of Defense or its components.  All 
mistakes and shortcomings are also the author’s alone.  The author extends special thanks to David 
Stewart, Professor from Practice, and Mary DeRosa, Professor from Practice, Georgetown University 
Law Center.  The author also thanks his wife and best friend Doreen, who by love and devotion makes 
all things possible. 
1. Samuel J. Cox, H-018-1: No Higher Honor—The Road to Operation Praying Mantis, 18 April 1988, 




3. Koohi v. United States, 976 F.2d 1328, 1330 (9th Cir. 1992).  Plaintiffs also alleged design 
defects in the warship’s weapon system.  Id.  The ultimate issue in Koohi was domestic sovereign 
immunity.  While both the Federal Tort Claims Act and the Public Vessels Act waive the federal 
government’s sovereign immunity, only the Tort Claims Act includes exceptions for combatant 
activities and discretionary functions.  Still, the Ninth Circuit in Koohi applied the combatant activities 
exception to the Public Vessels Act, finding that, “Under those circumstances, a ‘time of war’ exists, at 
least for purposes of domestic tort law.”  Id. at 1335.  Its rationale: “The [Federal Tort Claims Act’s] 
combatant activities exception specifically covers activities of naval and Coast Guard vessels.  Unless 
a similar exception is read into the [Public Vessels Act], this specification will be rendered nearly 
meaningless.”  Id. at 1336. 
4. Id. at 1331. 
5. Id. at 1328. 
6. Id. at 1331 (citing The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677 (1900)).  The only other case the Ninth 
Circuit referred to was Scheuer v. Rhodes, a case concerning the employment of the national guard during 
“the incident at Kent State,” a police action on American soil.  Id. (citing Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 
232, 247–49 (1974)).  According to the Ninth Circuit in Koohi: “These cases make clear that the claim 
of military necessity will not, without more, shield governmental operations from judicial review.”  Id. 
7. Id. 
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Federal courts typically apply the political question doctrine to matters of 
Commander-in-Chief discretion.  Yet, the Koohi proposition persists.8  
Worse, it relies on an error.  
The error of the Paquete Habana9 is the Supreme Court’s failure to 
consider whether the case concerned a matter of wartime military 
discretion.10  Due to this error, the Court failed to consider the political 
question doctrine.  
If the Koohi proposition indicates the import of the Paquete Habana, the 
error threatens to have a chilling effect on military operations.11  This is the 
 
8. See, e.g., Tarros S.p.A. v. United States, 982 F. Supp. 2d 325, 337 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (“While 
Habana and Koohi add a wrinkle to the analysis in this case, they do not change the result.”). 
9. Although decided in 1900, the U.S. Supreme Court case of the Paquete Habana has remained 
a staple of the jurisprudence of U.S. foreign relations law well beyond the terrorist attacks of 
September 11th, 2001.  See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW §§ 406 n.3, 
421 n.7 (AM. LAW INST. 2017).  Courts have relied on it most for its proposition that “international 
law is part of our law” and the passages that follow.  United States v. Yousef, 327 F.3d 56, 92 (2d Cir. 
2003) (“It has long been established that customary international law is part of the law of the United 
States to [a] limited extent.”).  So, in the interplay of international law and U.S. law, the Paquete Habana 
stands out as a landmark case.  In addition, preeminent national security lawyer and scholar Jamie Baker 
has added the Paquete Habana to a short list of national security cases which represents the body of case 
law with which every national security generalist should be familiar.  JAMES E. BAKER, IN THE 
COMMON DEFENSE: NATIONAL SECURITY LAW FOR PERILOUS TIMES 348 n.1 (2007).  It also 
appears in several places in the Department of Defense Law of War Manual published in 2015, the go-
to source for the DoD Office of General Counsel’s interpretation of the law of war.  OFF. OF GEN. 
COUNS., DEP’T OF DEF., DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE LAW OF WAR MANUAL 81 n.178 (June 2015), 
https://ogc.osd.mil/Portals/99/department_of_defense_law_of_war_manual%20%281%29.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/2W38-6XXE] [hereinafter DEP’T OF DEFENSE, LAW OF WAR MANUAL]. 
10. “Wartime military discretion” refers to actions undertaken in the conduct of hostilities— 
in the parlance of the law of armed conflict, measures implicating the jus in bello of the law of war— 
in declared or authorized war.  DEP’T OF DEF., LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 9, at 43.  This is in 
contrast to Commander-in-Chief discretion, which refers to measures implicating jus in bello in 
undeclared war, or war without congressional authorization.  
11. Brief of the Veterans of Foreign Wars of the United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of 
Defendants and Dismissal at 2, Al-Aulaqi v. Obama, 727 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2010), (No. 1:10-cv-
01469-JDB), 2010 WL 4974321 (“The VFW [Veterans of Foreign Wars] agrees with the Government’s 
arguments regarding why this suit is barred, including by the political question doctrine.  Rather than 
repeating those arguments, this amicus brief seeks to add perspective to the reasons why suits like the 
present action would threaten national security by interfering with ongoing military operations.  
Allowing this case to proceed would contravene the core military principle of ‘unity of command,’ and 
undermine the military’s chain of command, creating uncertainty for subordinate leaders and soldiers.  
Such litigation also would adversely affect unit cohesion, the glue which binds small units together in 
the heat of battle, and enables them to survive and accomplish their missions.  Further, litigation of 
cases such as this would undermine battlefield decisionmaking by subjecting tactical, operational and 
strategic decisions to second-guessing by courts far removed from the battlefield.  And, to the extent 
this case will involve the activities of special operations forces, the VFW urges the Court to tread with 
 
3
Collier: The Error of the Paquete Habana
Published by Digital Commons at St. Mary's University, 2021
  
386 ST. MARY’S LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 52:383 
Koohi problem.  Therefore, the principal aim of this Article is to test the Koohi 
proposition.  And because the Paquete Habana error is the basis of the Koohi 
proposition, addressing the Koohi problem requires examining this 
foundational error.  
First, this Article examines the Paquete Habana error, offering an outline 
of the opinion and an overview of points the opinion either overlooked or 
minimized in its rationale—points that should have shaped the Court’s 
decision.   
The Article goes on to explain the error in Section III, including an 
overview of judicial review and the political question doctrine.  This 
overview demonstrates how the Paquete Habana, while right in its result, was 
wrong in its rationale.  
In the fourth section, the Article considers judicial review12 on matters 
of Commander-in-Chief discretion, noting the Supreme Court cases of 
Youngstown13 and Baker v. Carr.14  These cases urge federal courts to defer 
on matters of Commander-in-Chief discretion by operation of the political 
question doctrine.  
In Section V, the Article considers more recent cases—Tarros S.p.A. v. 
United States15 and Wu Tien Li-Shou v. United States16—to show how the 
Paquete Habana error still obscures the application of judicial review in 
matters of Commander-in-Chief discretion and emphasizes the importance 
of the Paquete Habana error.  But these cases also show that the federal 
 
particular caution, because of the need to protect the extremely sensitive sources and methods utilized 
by our nation’s elite forces.”).  See generally Jack Goldsmith, Phillip Carter on VFW Brief Supporting 
Government in Al-Aulaqi, LAWFARE (Oct. 6, 2010, 11:14 AM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/phillip-
carter-vfw-brief-supporting-government-al-aulaqi [https://perma.cc/K6JN-QQ2R] (“Briefly stated, 
the VFW’s brief agrees with the Government’s motion to dismiss on, inter alia, political question 
grounds, but seeks to supplement the Court’s understanding of why the political question doctrine 
matters so much in the sphere of military operations, particularly with respect to special operations 
such as those at issue.”) (emphasis in original). 
12. Throughout, “judicial review” refers to the power of the federal civilian courts of the United 
States.  War crimes tribunals and courts-martial are beyond the scope of this Article.  If the actions of 
a naval officer or other military officer in the conduct of hostilities should be subject to judicial review, 
it should be the judicial review of courts-martial.  “Safe harbor” does not mean allowed to act with absolute 
impunity, but in accordance with the lex specialis of the law of war.  See DEP’T OF DEF., LAW OF WAR 
MANUAL, supra note 9, at 9 (“[T]he law of war is the lex specialis governing armed conflict.”). 
13. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952). 
14. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962). 
15. Tarros S.p.A. v. United States, 982 F. Supp. 2d 325 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). 
16. Wu Tien Li-Shou v. United States, 777 F.3d 175 (4th Cir. 2015). 
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judiciary can manage its duty of judicial review and maintain the proper 
separation of powers by undertaking the appropriate discriminating analysis. 
II.    EXAMINING THE ERROR 
On 15 February 1898, the U.S. warship USS Maine exploded in Havana 
Harbor.17  More than 250 U.S. Sailors and Marines died.18  Suspicion 
spread that a seaborne mine had caused the explosion.19  The press blamed 
Spain, and the people called for war.20  On 20 April, Congress passed a joint 
resolution authorizing military force,21 enabling President William 
McKinley to order a blockade along the northern coast of Cuba on 
22 April.22  On 25 April, Congress passed the formal declaration of war, 
 





20. The swell of public furor grew under the clamor of “Remember the Maine!  To hell with 
Spain!”  Samuel J. Cox, H-015-3: “Remember the Maine!  To Hell with Spain!”, NAVAL HIST. & HERITAGE 
COMMAND (May 3, 2019, 10:47 AM), https://www.history.navy.mil/content/history/nhhc/about-
us/leadership/director/directors-corner/h-grams/h-gram-015/h-015-3.html [https://perma.cc/ZR 
3D-AU2X].  Although it galvanized public opinion in favor of war, the sinking of the Maine was not 
the war’s principal cause.  See, e.g., JENNIFER K. ELSEA & MATTHEW C. WEED, CONG. RSCH. SERV., 
RL31133, DECLARATIONS OF WAR AND AUTHORIZATIONS FOR THE USE OF MILITARY FORCE: 
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND AND LEGAL IMPLICATIONS 2 (2014) (“The circumstances of 
President McKinley’s request for a declaration of war against Spain in 1898 stand in singular contrast 
to all the others.  McKinley’s request for a declaration of war on April 25, 1898, was approved by a 
voice vote of both Houses of Congress on that date.  His request was made after Spain had rejected a 
U.S. ultimatum that Spain relinquish its sovereignty over Cuba and permit Cuba to become an 
independent state.  This ultimatum was supported by a joint resolution of Congress, signed into law 
on April 20, 1898, that among other things, declared Cuba to be independent, demanded that Spain 
withdraw its military forces from the island, and directed and authorized the President to use the U.S. 
Army, Navy and militia of the various states to achieve these ends.  The war with Spain in 1898, in 
short, was not principally based on attacks on the United States but on a U.S. effort to end the Cuban 
insurrection against Spain, bring about Cuban independence, and restore a stable government and 
order on the island—outcomes that were believed by the United States to advance its interests.”). 
21. Act of Apr. 20, 1898, Pub. L. No. 55-24, 30 Stat. 738 (“Joint Resolution For the recognition 
of the independence of the people of Cuba, demanding that the Government of Spain relinquish its 
authority and government in the Island of Cuba, and to withdraw its land and naval forces from Cuba 
and Cuban waters, and directing the President of the United States to use the land and naval forces of 
the United States to carry these resolutions into effect.”).  
22. According to Naval History and Heritage Command, “The blockade of Northern Cuba 
became the early lynchpin of the American strategy.”  Blockade of Northern Cuba, NAVAL HIST.  
& HERITAGE COMMAND, https://www.history.navy.mil/research/publications/documentary-histor 
ies/united-states-navy-s/blockade-of-northern.html [https://perma.cc/3BLS-Y2WF]; see FRENCH 
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and the declaration recognized that a state of war had existed since the 
21 April.23  The error of the Paquete Habana is that the Court failed to 
recognize the issue as implicating wartime military discretion. 
John Long, the Secretary of the Navy, issued the blockade order, ordering 
the interdicting of Spanish ships and certain neutral ships.24  The Secretary 
communicated this order to the U.S. Navy’s North Atlantic Squadron 
commander, Admiral William T. Sampson, who instituted the blockade.25  
The next day, the President announced that the blockade had been ordered 
and would be maintained “in pursuance of the laws of the United States, 
and the laws of [n]ations applicable to such cases.”26  
There had been preparations earlier than 20 April.  On 6 April, 
Secretary Long telegraphed to then-Commodore Sampson with the 
following directives: (1) “In the event of hostilities with Spain, the 
Department wishes you to do all in your power to capture or destroy the 
Spanish war vessels in West Indian waters, including the small gunboats 
which are stationed along the coast of Cuba;” (2) “[I]n case of war, you will 
maintain a strict blockade of Cuba, particularly at the ports of Havana, 
 
ENSOR CHADWICK, THE RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES AND SPAIN: THE SPANISH-
AMERICAN WAR 55 (1911) (“A blockade of the Cuban coast and military assistance of the insurgents 
ashore by supplying arms and munitions of war, or by sending armed forces, were thus the first steps 
to be considered.  The Spanish troops efficiently blockaded both by sea and land, and under the ravaged 
conditions of the island, would succumb finally by mere starvation should not aid come by sea.”); see 
also The Question of Blockade, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 6, 1898, https://www.nytimes.com/1898/ 
04/06/archives/the-question-of-blockade.html [https://perma.cc/HA2Q-NPSH] (“[A]n early step 
on the part of the United States would be closing the ports of Havana and Matanzas, if no others.  This 
would essentially be a prelude to their capture, but, independent of capture, the shutting out of food 
and other supplies from the districts now occupied by the only available Spanish military force, and 
the prevention of its reinforcement, would require a blockade. . . .  [A] blockade of Havana and 
Matanzas would not only be of the highest advantage, but would be decisive.”). 
23. Act of Apr. 25, 1898, ch. 189, 30 Stat. 364. 
24. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 712–15 (1900); see Proclamation of Blockade by 
President William McKinley, transmitted by John D. Long, Sec’y of Navy, to James M. Forsyth, 
Commandant, Key West Naval Base (Apr. 22 1898), https://www.history.navy.mil/content/history/ 
nhhc/research/publications/documentary-histories/united-states-navy-s/blockade-of-northern/secr 
etary-of-the-nav-2.html [https://perma.cc/Q8Z5-DSQN] [hereinafter President McKinley’s 
Proclamation of Blockade to Forsyth] (proclaiming neutral vessels approaching Cuban ports would be 
subject to blockade measures). 
25. It was only on 21 April, in preparation for war, that the President made Sampson an admiral 
and gave him command of the North Atlantic Squadron.  CHADWICK, supra note 22, at 129–30 (“The 
reception of this telegram was equivalent to information that war was declared, inasmuch as under the 
law the president could only make such an assignment in war.”).  
26. President McKinley’s Proclamation of Blockade to Forsyth, supra note 24 (footnote 
omitted). 
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Matanzas;” and (3) “All prizes should be sent to Key West or other available 
United States ports for adjudication.”27 
Standing out against this background is the case of the Paquete Habana.  
A. A Case of War 
After setting up the blockade, the squadron seized two boats off Havana 
Harbor sailing under the Spanish flag and seized them.28  The sailors 
searched the ships and found the crewmen to be Cuban fishermen, the ships 
laden with live fish.29  Yet, as Admiral Sampson observed, these Cuban 
fishermen were also reservists of the Spanish navy.30  The Admiral ordered 
the squadron to detain the men as prisoners of war and take the ships to the 
army garrison at Key West.31 
On behalf of the United States, a U.S. attorney filed a petition calling 
upon the prize court to decide the propriety of the captures under prize 
law.32  The district court condemned the ships as a lawful prize and had 
them auctioned.33  The captives’ appointed lawyer appealed on their behalf, 
based on a rule of international law that exempted coastal fishing vessels 
 
27. Letter from John D. Long, Sec’y of the Navy, to William T. Sampson,  Rear Admiral, U.S. 
Navy, Commander of the N. Atl. Squadron (Apr. 6, 1898), https://www.history.navy.mil/ 
content/history/nhhc/research/publications/documentary-histories/united-states-navy-s/naval-ope 
rations-in/secretary-of-the-nav-10.html [https://perma.cc/GS8V-C468]. 
28. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. at 678. 
29. Id. at 679. 
30. Id. at 713.  Also important, the men “had a fishing license from the Spanish government.”  
Id. at 679.  They were fishing to feed the Spanish forces off Havana.  See CHADWICK, supra note 22, 
at 147 (detailing the movements and purposes of different foreign vessels).  For more on the Admiral’s 
observation about the crewmen as reservists of the Spanish navy, see infra note 56. 
31. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. at 713. 
32. Id. at 679.  Some background remarks are appropriate on prize law.  Captures at sea during 
wartime are considered under prize law and adjudicated in prize courts.  FRANCIS H. UPTON, THE 
LAW OF NATIONS AFFECTING COMMERCE DURING WAR: WITH A REVIEW OF THE JURISDICTION, 
PRACTICE AND PROCEEDINGS OF PRIZE COURTS 383 (1863) (“In the United States and Great Britain, 
the exclusive jurisdiction of maritime captures is vested in courts of admiralty, which in the exercise of 
this power are usually denominated prize courts.”).  Prize courts have jurisdiction to determine whether 
the property captured is or is not lawful prize under the law of nations.  Id. at 388 (“The prize 
jurisdiction of a court of admiralty, is that which authorizes it to take cognizance of captures made on 
the sea, jure belli; of captures in foreign ports and harbors . . . . for the purpose of determining whether 
the property captured or surrendered, is or is not lawful prize of war . . . .”).  To call for such 
adjudication, a libel and claim are filed in the prize court setting out the facts comprising the 
circumstances of the capture, and a hearing is held.  Id. at 406 (“In all cases, the hearing in the first 
instance, is upon the libel and claim, the ship’s papers and documents found on board, and the 
examination of the master and officers and crew of the captured vessel.”). 
33. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. at 679. 
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from capture as prizes.34  Based on an 1891 statute conferring jurisdiction, 
the appeal went “direct to the Supreme Court.”35  
1. The Rule and the Exception 
The Supreme Court took up the case on “the question [of] whether, upon 
the facts appearing in these records, the fishing smacks were subject to 
capture by the armed vessels of the United States during the recent war with 
Spain.”36  The Court considered the rule under the law of nations that 
exempted coastal fishing vessels from condemnation as prizes.  As the Court 
explained: “By an ancient usage among civilized nations, beginning centuries 
ago, and gradually ripening into a rule of international law, coast fishing 
vessels, pursuing their vocation of catching and bringing in fresh fish, have 
been recognized as exempt, with their cargoes and crews, from capture as 
prize of war.”37  The rule was far from absolute and had an exception for 
military necessity—an exception the Court failed to apply.38  
As the Court acknowledged, the rule “does not apply to coast fishermen 
or their vessels, if employed for a warlike purpose, or in such a way as to 
give aid or information to the enemy; nor when military or naval operations 
create a necessity to which all private interests must give way.”39  As 
evidence of the general rule, the Court noted relevant passages from “the 
works of jurists and commentators,”40 no fewer than five of which included 
language implying the military necessity exception.41  According to the 
Court: “No international jurist of the present day ha[d] a wider or more 
deserved reputation than [Argentine scholar Carlos] Calvo,” and even Calvo 
emphasized the military necessity exception to the general rule.42 
Nevertheless, the Court overlooked a critical fact when applying the rule.  
The taking of the ships was attendant to the apprehension of the fishermen 
 
34. Id. at 679, 686; see Act of July 17, 1862, ch. CCIV, § 12, 12 Stat. 608 (“[T]he Secretary of the 
Navy is hereby authorized to appoint an agent or to employ counsel when the captors do not employ 
counsel themselves, in any case in which he may consider it necessary to assist the district attorneys 
and protect the interests of the captors . . . .”). 
35. Act of Mar. 3, 1891, ch. 517, § 5, 26 Stat. 826.  The 1891 statute also allowed direct appeal 
to the U.S. Supreme Court in any case concerning the constitutionality of laws.  Id. 
36. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. at 686.  The “smacks” were the Paquete Habana and the Lola.  
37. Id. at 686. 
38. Id. at 706 (“[N]o jurist would seriously argue that their immunity must be respected if they 
were used for warlike purposes . . . .”). 
39. Id. at 708. 
40. Id. at 700. 
41. Id. at 702–04. 
42. Id. at 703. 
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as prisoners of war.  This nuance implicated the military necessity exception 
to the exemption.43  On its own volition, the Court appropriately 
 
43. This was beyond the scope of prize jurisdiction because prize jurisdiction was only 
concerned with the issue of prize and incidental torts.  UPTON, supra note 32, at 388–89.  “The federal 
courts, in exercising prize jurisdiction, exercise a considerable control over the navy in time of war.  
They not only return captured vessels and cargoes not liable to condemnation under international law, 
but decree damages against naval officers for illegal captures.”  Quincy Wright, The Control of the Foreign 
Relations of the United States: The Relative Rights, Duties, and Responsibilities of the President, of the Senate and the 
House, and of the Judiciary, in Theory and in Practice, 60 PROC. OF THE AM. PHIL. SOC’Y 99, 259 (1921) 
(citing Little v. Barreme, 6 U.S. 170 (1804), for the point on damages against naval officers).  Awarding 
damages for illegal captures was within the jurisdiction of prize courts.  UPTON, supra note 32,  
at 388–89.  However, judging the propriety of the taking of prisoners of war was not within that 
jurisdiction.  It is worth noting that the counsel for the United States, Henry M. Hoyt, Assistant 
Attorney General (and soon-to-be Solicitor General), did not argue the military necessity point in the 
case of The Paquete Habana.  U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 
OF THE UNITED STATES 26–27 (Nov. 30, 1900) (“The argument on behalf of the Government 
undertook to show that, while by express allowance of the sovereign or executive in the past, small 
fishing boats of the enemy near their own coasts were exempted on humane grounds and sometimes 
because they supplied subsistence to the belligerent’s own vessels on blockade duty, larger vessels of 
the types here involved ought not to be exempted, and were not in fact exempted under any well-
established rule of international law, unless by express executive ordinance.”).   
 As for why the Assistant Attorney General did not argue the military necessity exception, it is 
worth noting that the law of war was still very much underdeveloped.  Law of war as it is known 
today—which is a body of multilateral treaties establishing law-based norms for the conduct of 
warfare—had begun to come into existence by 1898, but only barely.  The “Lieber Code” of 1863 only 
concerned land warfare and was only a General Order applicable to the Union Army, not a source of 
international law.  DEP’T OF DEF., LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 9, at iii.  It is remarkable that 
only months after the captures of the Paquete Habana and the Lola, Secretary Long issued a General 
Order similar to the Lieber Code, The Laws and Usages of War at Sea.  Id.; John D. Long, Secretary of the 
Navy, General Order No. 551, The Laws and Usages of War at Sea, Jun. 27, 1900, reprinted as Appendix I in 
U.S. Naval War College, International Law Discussions, 1903: The United States Naval War Code of 1900, 
at 101 (1904).  Of particular relevance are Articles 3 and 11.  Article 3 says: “Military necessity permits 
measures that are indispensable for securing the ends of the war and that are in accordance with 
modern laws and usages of war.”  Id. at 103.  Article 11 states: “The personnel of a merchant vessel of 
an enemy captured as a prize can be held, at the discretion of the captor, as witnesses, or as prisoners 
of war when by training or enrollment they are immediately available for the naval service of the 
enemy.”  Id. at 105.  Still, this General Order came into force only after the captures.   
 As for international law, after the 1856 Paris Declaration Respecting Maritime Law, law of war at 
sea did not again become the subject of multilateral treaty law until the First Hague Peace Conference 
of 1899, which resulted in, among other things, the Hague Convention on Maritime Warfare.  Treaties, 
States Parties and Commentaries, INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, https://ihl-databases.icrc. 
org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/vwTreatiesHistoricalByDate.xsp [https://perma.cc/Z6XR-B8J4].  Thus, the 
case of the Paquete Habana fell within a law-of-war gap, so to say.  There seems to have also been an 
ever-present consideration of humanity, starting from the press reports (many of them accurate, some 
wildly overblown) on the atrocities of the Spanish toward the Cubans.  See, e.g., MICHAEL WALZER, 
JUST AND UNJUST WARS: A MORAL ARGUMENT WITH HISTORICAL ILLUSTRATIONS 103 (5th ed. 
2015) (explaining that the American military intervention was a response to Spanish brutality, among 
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ascertained the military necessity exception, yet failed to apply the 
exception.44  Rather than explain its rationale, the Court only mentioned in 
passing that there was no evidence supporting the application of the 
exception.45  On this premise, the Court inferred that the Admiral had 
violated higher orders.46  The Court’s rationale reveals the error.    
2. The Rationale and the Error 
The Court erroneously inferred that the Admiral violated the orders of 
the Secretary of the Navy.47  On 25 April 1898—the day Congress declared 
war with Spain, five days after the authorization for the use of force and 
three days after the blockade order—the North Atlantic Squadron captured 
the first ship, the Paquete Habana, sailing under the Spanish flag on course to 
Havana, Cuba.48  Two days later, 27 April, the squadron captured the 
second ship, the Lola, also sailing towards Havana under the Spanish flag.49   
 
other reasons).  In addition to Mr. Hoyt’s note that the customary exemption was on humane grounds, 
a contemporary also made the same observation (and in the same volume of the same journal).  Charles 
Noble Gregory, The Law of Blockade, 12 YALE L.J. 339, 346 (1903) (“An interesting and humane 
exception has been recently allowed by our own highest court in the case of fishing boats.”).  
44. This is another factor that makes Little v. Barreme inapposite.  Little v. Barreme, 6 U.S. 170 
(1804).  In Little, a prize case, the Supreme Court said, “the [President’s] instructions cannot change 
the nature of the transaction, or legalize an act which without those instructions would have been a 
plain trespass.”  Id. at 179.  In contrast, in the Paquete Habana, the President’s instructions were in 
compliance with the law of nations, and the Court said so itself.  The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. at 712 
(“The position taken by the United States during the recent war with Spain was quite in accord with 
the rule of international law, now generally recognized by civilized nations, in regard to coast fishing 
vessels.”).  There are other facts that are important.  For example, Little concerned the “undeclared, 
Quasi War” with France.  See, e.g., J. Gregory Sidak, The Quasi War Cases—and Their Relevance to Whether 
“Letters of Marque and Reprisal” Constrain Presidential War Powers, 28 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 465, 468 
(2005) (concerning “the right of a sovereign nation to make decisions regarding” the waging of war).  
The Spanish-American War was a declared war, a factor that makes the campaign more a matter of 
political discretion.  Also, in Little, it was not disputed that the vessel captured was in fact a neutral 
vessel.  Little, 6 U.S. at 178–79.  
45. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. at 713–14. 
46. As law scholar Michael Glennon has noted: “A close reading of The Paquete Habana reveals 
that the Court invalidated acts of lower-level executive officials, not those of the President, because 
the acts violated the President’s orders.”  MICHAEL J. GLENNON, CONSTITUTIONAL DIPLOMACY 244 
(1990). 
47. Admiral Chadwick has also made the point: “In accord with the navy department’s 
instructions, which would seem sufficiently explicit, a number of these vessels were sent into  
Key West.”  CHADWICK, supra note 22, at 146 n.1. 
48. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. at 713.  A packet is “a passenger boat usually carrying mail and 
cargo.”  Packet, Merriam-Webster Dictionary, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/packet 
[https://perma.cc/TZX6-PHFV]. 
49. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. at 714. 
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The next day, 28 April, Admiral Sampson telegraphed Secretary Long: 
I find that a large number of fishing schooners are attempting to get into 
Havana from their fishing grounds near the Florida reefs and coasts.  They 
are generally manned by excellent seamen, belonging to the maritime 
inscription of Spain, who have already served in the Spanish navy, and who 
are liable to further service.  As these trained men are naval reserves, have a 
semi-military character, and would be most valuable to the Spaniards as 
artillerymen, either afloat or ashore, I recommend that they should be 
detained prisoners of war, and that I should be authorized to deliver them to 
the commanding officer of the army at Key West.50 
On 30 April Secretary Long responded: “Spanish fishing vessels 
attempting to violate blockade are subject, with crew, to capture, and any 
such vessel or crew considered likely to aid [the] enemy may be detained.”51  
In interpreting these correspondences, here is what the Court had to say: 
The Admiral’s despatch assumed that he was not authorized, without express 
order, to arrest coast fishermen peaceably pursuing their calling; and the 
necessary implication and evident intent of the response of the Navy 
Department were that Spanish coast fishing vessels and their crews should 
not be interfered with, so long as they neither attempted to violate the 
blockade, nor were considered likely to aid the enemy.52 
This passage reveals the Court’s error.  Contrary to the Court’s assertions, 
the Admiral knew that the fishermen who might be of use to the Spanish 
navy were not ordinary fishermen to whom the rule of exemption applied 
in the absolute, and the Secretary authorized the captures if the Admiral 
deemed the men likely to aid the enemy.53  
This point is supported by the history that followed.  In The Relations of 
the United States and Spain: The Spanish American War, published in 1911, 
retired Rear Admiral French Ensor Chadwick (who was also a veteran of 
the War and had served with Admiral Sampson) said: “Several fishing-
schooners were released after their cargoes were thrown overboard, but the 
admiral, in doubt as to the propriety of such release, telegraphed to the navy 
 
50. Id. at 712–13. 
51. Id. at 713. 
52. Id. 
53. Id. at 712–13. 
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department . . . .  His suggestions were approved by a telegram from the 
navy department, dated April 30, but not received until May 2.”54  
However, as the Court continued: 
[The Paquete Habana] had no arms or ammunition on board; she had no 
knowledge of the blockade, or even of the war, until she was stopped by a 
blockading vessel; she made no attempt to run the blockade, and no resistance 
at the time of the capture; nor was there any evidence whatever of likelihood 
that she or her crew would aid the enemy.55 
This passage reveals the Court misconstrued Admiral Sampson’s telegram 
and the Secretary’s response.56 
 
54. See CHADWICK, supra note 22, at 146 (detailing the prevention of further supplies from 
reaching forces is necessary to the scheme of blockade). 
55. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. at 713–14. 
56. Admiral Chadwick expressed astonishment with the result: “The final outcome of this 
action,” referring to the Supreme Court’s decision, “was of an extraordinary character.”  CHADWICK, 
supra note 22, at 146 n.1.  He continued:  
While the present writer has the utmost respect for the ability and learning of this eminent judge, 
he cannot think his treatment of this case wholly logical. . . .  The Havana vessels were furnishing 
food to a beleaguered army; beleaguered by sea by the fleet, practically by land by the insurgents, 
to the extent at least that food was not obtainable from the surrounding country.  Their only ports 
were those so blockaded.  The cutting off of the food supply of an enemy so situated has always 
been recognized as a military duty and as an important element in the reduction of a fortress.  
This of itself demanded at least their detention.  The fact that their crews were reservists of the 
Spanish navy, trained men who undoubtedly would have been utilized in the Havana defence, 
was an additional reason of equal or perhaps greater weight. . . .  [A]s the case stood, the fishing-
vessels seized and condemned were intending to violate a blockade and carry food to a besieged 
enemy. 
Id. at 147 n.1.  One scholar (who now happens to be the Chief Judge of the Court of Appeals for the 
Armed Forces) has noted Admiral Chadwick’s observations as “dubious.”  Scott W. Stucky, The 
Paquete Habana: A Case History in the Development of International Law, 15 UNIV. BALT. L. REV. 1, 20 
(1985).  Chief Judge Stucky was gracious enough to engage with the author on this point in a series of 
emails between 12 August and 15 September 2020].  After all, the ships did not have a Spanish 
commission, and none of the crewman knew anything about the war or the blockade.  Scott W. Stucky, 
The Paquete Habana: A Case History in the Development of International Law, 15 UNIV. BALT. L. REV. 1, 
14–15 (1985).  However, some news reports from 1898 lend credibility to Admiral Chadwick’s 
observations, at least with respect to the crewmen being reservists in the Spanish navy.  For example, 
after publishing the report on the administration’s views concerning the President’s rules of 
engagement on 26 April, the New York Times also published reports on several of the other captured 
fishing boats.  According to the report of the capture of the Engracia: “Only one blank shot was 
necessary to bring her to.  She had on board a crew of seven men and a cargo of fish.  The men on 
board the prize had been in the Spanish Navy, and served as a sort of naval reserve.”  The Newport Takes 
 
12
St. Mary's Law Journal, Vol. 52 [2021], No. 2, Art. 3
https://commons.stmarytx.edu/thestmaryslawjournal/vol52/iss2/3
  
2021] THE ERROR OF THE PAQUETE HABANA 395 
It was not the Court’s province to weigh the propriety of the Admiral’s 
determination that the crewmen were likely to aid the enemy.  The justiciable 
issue, properly framed, was whether the district court was wrong to have 
condemned the captured ships as lawful prizes.57  The district court’s 
condemnation of the ships under prize law was subject to judicial review.  
However, the ships’ capture was attendant to the crewmen’s capture as 
suspected reservists of the Spanish navy, and so was not subject to judicial 
review.58  The heart of the error was the Court’s inference that Admiral 
Sampson’s capture of the ships was contrary to higher orders and violated 
the customary norm.59 
Three justices dissented, and, on the issue of discretion, the dissenters 
had it right.  Chief Justice Melville Fuller—together with Associate Justices 
John Harlan and Joseph McKenna—conceded, “I am unable to conclude 
that there is any such established international rule, or that this court can 
properly revise action which must be treated as having been taken in the 
ordinary exercise of discretion in the conduct of war.”60  
Regarding when the Admiral dispatched the Secretary, the dissenters 
continued on this point: “Of course they would be liable to be if involved 
in the guilt of blockade running, and the Secretary agreed that they might be 
[if likely to aid the enemy] in the Admiral’s discretion.  All this was in 
accordance with the rules and usages of international law.”61 
 
a Sloop, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 30, 1898, https://timesmachine.nytimes.com/timesmachine/1898/05/ 
01/102071761.html [https://perma.cc/A2NT-Q626].  There was also the issue of impressment, which 
is “the state authority to require the service of a subject for the defence of the country.”  THE OXFORD 
COMPANION TO SHIPS AND THE SEA 415 (Peter Kemp ed., 1988) (1976) (“Impressment was a general 
and recognized method of recruitment in most countries of the world, and applied equally to service 
ashore and afloat.”).  With the blockade cutting off Spain’s ability to send men to reinforce its army 
and navy, it had little choice but to impress seafaring Cuban merchantmen into military and naval 
service.  This fact had shaped the state of affairs for Admiral Sampson and the North Atlantic 
Squadron.  For example, as reported in the New York Times on 1 May 1898: “The captain of the Lola 
hove to when a blank shot was put across his bows, declaring that he would rather be captured by the 
Americans than enter [General] Blanco’s service, which he would be compelled to do if he went into 
Havana.”  Fishing Smack Lola Taken, N.Y. TIMES, May 1, 1898, https://timesmachine.nytimes.com/ 
timesmachine/1898/05/01/102071761.html [https://perma.cc/DBC2-69YD].  It was after the 
capture of the Lola that Admiral Sampson telegraphed Secretary Long.  
57. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. at 678.  
58. Id. 
59. Id. at 715 (Fuller, J., dissenting). 
60. Id. 
61. Id. at 717. 
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All this follows from the opinion’s details.  However, there are facts not 
recited that are also important.  These facts also show that the Admiral 
followed the President’s orders. 
B. The President’s Rules of Engagement 
According to the joint resolution authorizing military force, a state of war 
had existed since 21 April.62  On 26 April, President McKinley, through the 
Secretary of State and Secretary Long, communicated this authorization to 
Admiral Sampson.63  The President’s letter also established certain rules of 
engagement, which reproduced the provisions of the 1856 Paris Declaration 
Respecting Maritime Law, a law of war treaty.64  The President also directed 
that the war was to be “conducted upon principles in harmony with the 
present views of nations & sanctioned by their recent practice.”65  
The rules of engagement also said that, notwithstanding the blockade, 
under certain conditions, Spanish merchant vessels should be allowed to 
pass until 21 May,  
provided that nothing here in contained shall apply to Spanish vessels having 
on board any officer in the military or naval service of the enemy or any coal 
except such as may be necessary for their voyage; or any other articles 




62. Id. at 712. 
63. Id. 
64. See DEP’T OF DEF., LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 9, at 1157 (“The United States [was] 
not a Party to the 1856 Paris Declaration.”).  For a brief overview of the state of the law of war in 1898, 
see supra note 43. 
65. Telegraph from John D. Long, Sec’y of the Navy, to William T. Sampson, Rear Admiral, 
U.S. Navy, Commander of the N. Atl. Squadron (Apr. 26, 1898), https://www.history.navy.mil/ 
research/publications/documentary-histories/united-states-navy-s/blockade-of-northern/secretary-
of-the-nav.html [https://perma.cc/A43V-KG5W]. 
66. Id.; see William T. Sampson, Instructions to Blockading Vessels and Cruisers (May 5, 1898) 
(unpublished military instructions), http://hrnm.navy.mil/research/publications/documentary-
histories/united-states-navy-s/naval-operations-in/instructions-to-bloc.html [https://perma.cc/8A 
JF-7EDM] [hereinafter Sampson, Instructions to Blockading] (incorporating Admiral Sampson’s 
instructions by reference). 
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More than that, Navy regulations passed in 1862 had made the violation 
or disobedience of orders, or the carrying out of orders with negligence or 
carelessness, punishable by court-martial.67  These regulations, The Articles 
for the Government of the Navy, set out several constraints on prize captures and 
remained in force throughout the war.68 
Between 22 and 26 April, and notwithstanding the 30-day grace period, 
the North Atlantic Squadron captured and sent for adjudication four 
Spanish ships, documented as “unarmed steamers.”69  Some were merchant 
ships,70 and the President was “[n]ot [p]leased with the [c]apture of 
[m]erchantmen,” such captures appearing to be against the orders of 
26 April.71  The next day, the New York Times published a report to that 
effect.72 
Still, those rules of engagement did not cover captures made before the 
President’s order.  The Administration expressed its view that the propriety 
of such seizures should be left to prize courts:  
[C]aptures made before the proclamation must be judged according to the 
general principles of international law, which do not preclude such captures.  Each 
 
67. Act of Jul. 17, 1862, ch. CCIV, § 1, art. 1, 12 Stat. 608 (1862); see also Wright, supra note 43, 
at 259 (“Military and naval regulations and instructions are enforced by courts martial whose 
jurisdiction, however, is largely confined to the statutory articles of war, and by military commissions.”). 
68. Act of Jul. 17, 1862, ch. CCIV, § 1, art. 1, 12 Stat. 608. 
69. Spanish Ships and Commanders, NAVAL HIST. & HERITAGE COMMAND, https://www.history. 
navy.mil/research/publications/documentary-histories/united-states-navy-s/list-ships-commanders/ 
spanish-ships-and-commanders.html [https://perma.cc/89WW-TK3T].  
70. The ships were the Argonauta, Buena Ventura, Catalina, and the Miguel Jover.  The Argonauta 
was a mail steamer laden with “general merchandise, with a large quantity of arms and ammunition 
intended for the Spanish troops in Cuba.”  The Argonauta at Key West, N.Y. TIMES, May 4, 1898, 
https://www.nytimes.com/1898/05/04/archives/the-argonauta-at-key-west-col-de-cortijo-weylers-
brotherinlaw-on.html.  The Buena Ventura, laden with lumber, was determined to be a good prize, but 
the Supreme Court reversed the decision.  The Buena Ventura, 175 U.S. 384, 391, (1899).  The Miguel 
Jover and the Catalina, both laden with cotton, were released.  CHADWICK, supra note 22, at 132–34. 
71. President and the Prizes, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 27, 1898, https://www.nytimes.com/1898/04/27/ 
archives/president-and-the-prizes-his-proclamation-not-retroactive-mr.html. 
72. Id. (“The proclamation does not make any specific reference to ships taken prior to its 
promulgation [on April 26].  In some quarters it has been assumed that it was intended to be operative 
from the day the war began, which is officially set down as April 21.  Under this interpretation the 
vessels taken in Cuban waters up to date would be exempt from capture, and would have to be returned 
to their owners, with consequent loss of prize money to their captors.  This, however, is not the view 
taken by the Administration.”). 
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case will go before the prize court . . . and be adjudicated upon its merits 
according to the well[-]defined rules and regulations of the laws of nations.73 
Now, remember the squadron had captured the Paquete Habana on the 
25th and the Lola on the 27th.74  The Secretary’s dispatch on the 26th 
communicated the Administration’s intent to allow the passage of merchant 
ships as exempt from prize capture, with the exception that those likely to 
the aid the enemy were to be detained.75  Admiral Sampson’s telegram on 
the 28th described the special character of the crewmen—being such as to 
put them in the exception to the President’s directive—expecting more 
ships with men of similar character and requested authorization to take them 
as prisoners.76  The Secretary’s response on 30 April left to the Admiral’s 
judgment whether the men were likely to aid the enemy.77  In exercising 
that judgment, the Admiral’s actions complied with the President’s orders 
and the rules of engagement.78 
After the Secretary’s dispatch of 30 April stating “any such vessel or crew 
[considered] likely to aid the enemy may be detained,” which Admiral 
Sampson received on 2 May, the Admiral issued rules of engagement of his 
own.79 
C. The Admiral’s Rules of Engagement 
On 5 May the Admiral published an order to his men: “The vessels of 
this Squadron while engaged in blockading and cruising service, will be 
governed by the rules of International law and the decisions of Prize 
 
73. Id. (emphasis added) (“The information comes from thoroughly trustworthy sources that 
the President and his Cabinet have viewed the prize-taking performances of the fleet off Havana with 
anything but enthusiasm.  The President is understood to be inclined to view these as unworthy [of] 
the dignity of American war ships, and to regret them as tending to put this country in a bad light 
before the world.  The suggestion has been made that, regarding the seizure of these ships in the light 
of misfortunes as he does, the President might take upon himself to order their release.  He has the 
power to do this before the cases are adjudicated in the prize court, and there is no doubt that he would 
exercise it were it not that such action might be taken by the officers of the fleet as a rebuke to their 
zeal, the good intentions of which are not doubted.”). 
74. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 713–14 (1900). 
75. President and the Prizes, supra note 71. 
76. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. at 712–13. 
77. Id. at 713. 
78. As were the prize captures.  Consider what the Supreme Court said only a few years later, 
that, in the case of the Paquete Habana, the Lola, and the other similar vessels, “The libels alleged a 
capture pursuant to instructions from the President.”  United States v. Paquete Habana (The Paquete 
Habana II), 189 U.S. 453, 465 (1903). 
79. CHADWICK, supra note 22, at 146. 
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courts.”80  Far from leaving the men to educate themselves on the rules, the 
Admiral set out in writing the most salient provisions—twenty-eight in total, 
of almost 2,000 words.81  Most important among them was this: “A neutral 
vessel carrying troops or military personages of the enemy is liable to 
seizure.”82  
Notice the reference to neutral vessels.83  If neutral vessels “carrying 
troops or military personages of the enemy” were liable to capture, also 
liable to capture were enemy vessels, and the Paquete Habana, the Lola, and 
the other similar vessels were all flying the Spanish flag.84 
Admiral Sampson stopped and searched the two vessels to enforce the 
order of blockade, following the authorization for the use of military force, 
presidential directive, rules of engagement, and international law.85  When 
the Admiral discovered that the men were likely reservists of the Spanish 
Navy, he took them prisoner, as they were men of the character that the 
President specifically noted as those who were to be captured.  Still, the 
Admiral sought guidance for good measure.86 
After the Admiral’s squadron interdicted the ships and the Admiral sent 
the detained crewmen to the army base at Key West, the matter was out of 
his hands, and the condemnation of the ships as prizes was completely 
separate.87  The instructions he published to his men suggest the Admiral 
had not acted contrary to his interpretation of Secretary Long’s dispatch but 
following it—it being consistent with the applicable law of nations and with 
the intent of the Commander-in-Chief.88 
All this is not to mention the North Atlantic Squadron ships, between the 
2nd and the 9th of May, captured at least eight other fishing boats, three 
after Admiral Sampson’s receipt of the President’s rules of engagement, and 
 
80. Instructions to Blockading, supra note 66.  The Admiral also reproduced the President’s rules of 
engagement, its provisions to be incorporated by reference.  According to Admiral Chadwick’s first 
volume, Admiral Sampson’s rules of engagement, Instructions to Blockading Vessels and Cruisers, were “but 
slightly modified” by the State Department.  CHADWICK, supra note 22, at 145. 
81. Instructions to Blockading, supra note 66. 
82. Id. 
83. Id. 
84. “The flag or pass under which a ship is sailed is deemed conclusive evidence of its national 
character, though in general, the national character of a vessel depends on the domicil of the owner.”  
UPTON, supra note 32, at 410. 
85. Instructions to Blockading, supra note 66. 
86. Id. 
87. The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635, 651 (1863). 
88. Jurisdiction: Admiralty and Maritime, FED. JUD. CTR., https://www.fjc.gov/history/courts/ 
jurisdiction-admiralty-and-maritime [https://perma.cc/Z6SP-L2DY]. 
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five after the Admiral’s own rules of engagement.89  No telegram came to 
admonish the squadron or prevent any further captures.90 
So while a close reading of the Paquete Habana reveals that the Court 
invalidated acts of lower-level executive branch officials, not those of the 
President, the facts and circumstances attendant to the seizures that the 
Court overlooked (and a natural reading of the Paquete Habana II) reveal that 
this invalidation was in error.91 
The Court decided the case in 1900, yet the Paquete Habana error had its 
origins in 1803, in the origins of the doctrine of political questions.  
III.    EXPLAINING THE ERROR 
“[W]here there is no treaty, and no controlling [e]xecutive or legislative 
act or judicial decision, resort must be had to the customs and usages of 
civilized nations,”92 so went the Court’s reasoning, “and, as evidence of 
these, to the works of jurists and commentators . . . . not for the 
speculations of their authors concerning what the law ought to be, but for 
trustworthy evidence of what the law really is.”93  Yet the federal courts’ 
authority to say what the law is came from a source that also put profound 
constraints on that authority, constraints the Court ignored.94  The Supreme 
 
89. Paco (captured by Newport on 2 May); Oriente and Suarez (captured by Helena and 
Montgomery respectively on 5 May); Espana and Padre de Dios (both captured by Newport on 7 May); 
Santiago Apostal (captured by Mayflower on 8 May); Fernandito and Severito (captured by Vicksburg and 
Dolphin respectively on 9 May).  Spanish Vessels Captured up to Evening of May 19, N.Y. TRIBUNE, May 21, 
1898, at 3, https://www.newspapers.com/image/468657509/.  The Supreme Court in 1903 listed 
these ships as “fishing smacks, which were libeled as prize of war,” and, “[t]he proceedings in all the 
cases are similar and the evidence, to a large extent, the same” as the Paquete Habana and the Lola.  
United States v. Paquete Habana (The Paquete Habana II), 189 U.S. 453, 463–64 (1903).  The Dolphin, 
Newport, Helena, Montgomery, Mayflower, and Vicksburg were ships of the North Atlantic Squandron under 
the command of Admiral Sampson.  CHADWICK, supra note 22, at 399–400. 
90. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 712–13 (1900). 
91. See generally The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677; The Paquete Habana II, 189 U.S. 453. 
92. LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE U.S. CONSTITUTION 240 (2d ed. 1996). 
93. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. at 700.  See generally HENKIN, supra note 92, at 241 (“[I]t is not 
clear that the Court’s incidental qualification was addressing the significance of a public act that was 
inconsistent with the international principle.  In context, the Court was telling the courts how they 
should determine whether a particular rule has become a principle of international law.  The Court said 
that one has to explore the practice of states and distill a principle from that practice, unless a public 
act by some branch of the U.S. government has already determined and codified the principle on behalf 
of the United States.  By this reading, the Court’s statement did not address at all whether the Executive 
(or Congress) is free to act contrary to international law.”) 
94. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803) (giving the courts authority to interpret the law) 
(explaining the federal courts have the authority to interpret appropriate laws). 
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Court had applied the political question doctrine to political discretion 
matters since the inception of judicial review.95 
The Constitution of the United States divides foreign relations powers 
between Congress and the President, and this division is most profound for 
war powers.  Article I gives Congress the power “To declare War,” “To raise 
and support Armies,” “To provide and maintain a Navy,” and “To make 
Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces.”96  
There are also, of course, the Necessary and Proper Clause97 and the 
Appropriations Clause.98  Article II makes the President the Chief 
Executive99 and “Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United 
States, and of the Militia of the several States, when called into the actual 
Service of the United States.”100  The framework is also important.101 
War powers include—as two realms of international law—treaties and 
the “law of nations.”102  What was once the law of nations in the parlance 
 
95. Id. at 170 (explaining the courts decide the rights of individuals, not “how the executive, or 
executive officers, perform duties in which they have a discretion”). 
96. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11–14. 
97. Id. cl. 18.  Congress relied on the Necessary & Proper Clause when it passed the War Powers 
Resolution of 1973.  See 50 U.S.C. § 1541(b) (“Under article I, section 8, of the Constitution, it is 
specifically provided that the Congress shall have the power to make all laws necessary and proper for 
carrying into execution, not only its own powers but also all other powers vested by the Constitution 
in the Government of the United States, or in any department or officer thereof.”). 
98. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 12; Id. § 9, cl. 7. 
99. Id. art. II, § 1, cl. 1. 
100. Id. § 2, cl. 1. 
101. HAROLD HONGJU KOH, THE NATIONAL SECURITY CONSTITUTION: SHARING POWER 
AFTER THE IRAN-CONTRA AFFAIR 68 (1990). 
102. In addition to the Declare War Clause, Article I, Section 8, of the Constitution of the 
United States says in pertinent part: “The Congress shall have Power . . . To define and punish . . . 
Offences against the Law of Nations.”  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10.  Article II, Section 2, says the 
President “shall have Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate to make Treaties, 
provided two thirds of the Senators present concur.”  Id. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.  As for the judicial power, 
Article III says: “The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this 
Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their 
Authority; . . . to all Cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction; [and] to Controversies to which the 
United States shall be a Party.”  Id. art. III, § 2.  On treaties and the law of nations, see John Jay, Federalist 
Papers: Primary Documents in American History; The Federalist No. 3, LIBR. OF CONG., 
https://guides.loc.gov/federalist-papers/text-1-10#s-lg-box-wrapper-25493266 [https://perma.cc/ 
5G3F-85BB] (“The [just] causes of war, for the most part, arise either from violation of treaties or 
from direct violence.  America has already formed treaties with no less than six foreign nations . . . .  It 
is of high importance to the peace of America that she observe the laws of nations towards all these 
powers.”).  In 1793, Jay had more to say on treaties and the law of nations: “Treaties between 
independent nations, are contracts or bargains which derive all their force and obligation from mutual 
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of the Revolution is now customary international law.103  International law 
comprises maritime law, which in turn includes prize law, decided in courts 
of admiralty.104  Under Article III of the Constitution, which gives the 
United States’ judicial power to the federal courts, the Judiciary Act of 1789 
gave jurisdiction on all admiralty and maritime cases to the district courts.105  
The law of 1891, building on this framework, also gave the Supreme Court 
appellate jurisdiction over prize cases, direct from the districts.106 
With this background in mind, it is hard to overstate that the  
Supreme Court in the Paquete Habana was sitting as a prize court, not a court 
of general jurisdiction.107  It had cognizance only over matters of  
prize.108  What follows is that the Paquete Habana holding is limited to prize 
cases, and though the case might persuade, it should not serve as precedent 
for non-prize cases.  The holding of the Paquete Habana was that the ships 
 
consent and agreement . . .  As to the laws of nations—they are those laws by which nations are bound 
to regulate their conduct towards each other, both in peace and war.”  Grand Jury Charge of 1793, 
reproduced in Henfield’s Case, 11 F. Cas. 1099, 1100 (Cir. C. Pa. 1793) (No. 6360). 
103. Customary international law is “a type of unwritten law grounded in the ‘practice of 
states.’”  JAMES R. HOLMES, A BRIEF GUIDE TO MARITIME STRATEGY 7 (2019) (“Customary 
international law exists alongside treaty law, much as common law coexists with written laws in many 
domestic legal systems.  In other words, what states do—their observable behavior—indicates what 
they believe international law and norms to be.”).  James R. Holmes is a naval strategist and current J. 
C. Wylie Chair of Maritime Strategy at the Naval War College.  James R. Holmes, Ph.D., U.S. NAVAL 
WAR COLL., https://usnwc.edu/Faculty-and-Departments/Directory/James-R-Holmes [https:// 
perma.cc/GGR5-GWUZ].  
104. Jurisdiction: Admiralty and Maritime, supra note 88. 
105. In 1789, Congress passed the Judiciary Act.  Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73.  The 
Act established, specifically, the federal districts: “Each district was generally coextensive with a state; 
each had a federal district court and a district judge.  The districts, in turn, were grouped into three 
circuits.  In each circuit, a circuit court, made up of two Supreme Court Justices and one district judge, 
sat twice a year.”  LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 94 (Oxford Univ. Press 
4d ed. 2019) (1973).  Thus, as legal scholar Joseph Sweeney has explained: “In 1789, the federal courts, 
sitting as prize courts, were vested with exclusive jurisdiction, as against the state courts, to decide the 
legality of a capture as prize and any issue incidental to the capture, such as a claim for reparation of a 
tort committed by the captors.”  Joseph Modeste Sweeney, A Tort Only in Violation of the Law of Nations, 
18 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 445, 447 (1995).  
106. Jurisdiction: Appellate, FED. JUD. CTR., https://www.fjc.gov/history/courts/jurisdiction-
appellate [https://perma.cc/WCB2-WRJ2]. 
107. See Sweeney, supra note 105, at 483 (“The Supreme Court of the United States was sitting 
in the case as a court of prize.  In so doing, it remained, of course, a court of the United States, but it 
was not sitting as such.  In the famous words of Lord Stowell, it was sitting as ‘a Court of the Law of 
Nations.’”).  
108. “The prize jurisdiction of a court of admiralty, is that which authorizes it to take cognizance 
of captures made on the sea . . . for the purpose of determining whether the property captured or 
surrendered, is or is not lawful prize of war.”  UPTON, supra note 32, at 388. 
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and their cargos were not lawful prizes, a very narrow holding.109  
Therefore, it is an error to think of it as an abrogation of the political 
question doctrine as applied to matters of wartime military discretion or 
Commander-in-Chief discretion.   
Let us examine the doctrine. 
A. Judicial Review and Political Questions 
Article III of the Constitution says the United States’ judicial power shall 
extend to cases arising under the Constitution and laws of the United States 
and controversies to which the United States is a party.110  However, the 
Constitution does not say the judicial power includes the authority “to say 
what the law is.”111  The federal courts’ authority “to say what the law is” 
comes from Marbury v. Madison,112 which also established the doctrine of 
political questions.113  The political question doctrine established that 
matters of political discretion are not subject to judicial review.114 
In Marbury, Chief Justice John Marshall famously announced: “It is 
emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what 
the law is.  Those who apply the rule to particular cases, must of necessity 
expound and interpret that rule.”115  However, as Chief Justice Marshall 
also emphasized, 
By the [C]onstitution of the United States, the President is invested with 
certain important political powers, in the exercise of which he is to use his 
own discretion, and is accountable only to his country in his political 
character, and to his own conscience.  To aid him in the performance of these 
duties, he is authorized to appoint certain officers, who act by his authority 
and in conformity with his orders.   
In such cases, their acts are his acts; and whatever opinion may be 
entertained of the manner in which executive discretion may be used, still 
there exists, and can exist, no power to control that discretion.  The subjects 
 
109. See generally The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677(1900). 
110. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. 
111. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803). 
112. Id. 
113. Id. at 170 (describing how the courts decide the rights of individuals, not how the executive 
and his officers perform their duties in which they have discretion). 
114. Id.  
115. Id. at 177. 
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are political.  They respect the nation, not individual rights, and being 
entrusted to the executive, the decision of the executive is conclusive.116 
As Chief Justice Marshall continued, 
The province of the court is, solely, to decide on the rights of individuals, not 
to enquire how the executive, or executive officers, perform duties in which 
they have a discretion.  Questions, in their nature political, or which are, by 
the [C]onstitution and laws, submitted to the executive, can never be made in 
this court.117  
That is, there are questions that may be presented to a court of law but 
that a court of law may not decide—which is to say they are nonjusticiable—
because they are political in nature, or are, by the Constitution and laws, 
“submitted” to the executive.118  This principle constitutes the first 
formulation of the political question doctrine.119   
Now, it is true that “Nothing in this general formulation implied that 
presidential initiatives over the war power fell outside the scope of judicial 
review.”120  However, it is also true that nothing in the general formulation 
of judicial review over the war power had implied that judicial review should 
operate to call into question matters of wartime military discretion or 
Commander-in-Chief discretion.121  In fact, Supreme Court cases had 
expressly applied the political question doctrine to bar such matters from 
judicial review.122 
B. Wartime Actions and Political Discretion 
By the time of the Paquete Habana, the Supreme Court had explained war 
measures were not subject to judicial review.123  Consider what the 
Supreme Court had to say in the Prize Cases:124 
 
116. Id. at 165–66. 
117. Id. at 170. 
118. Id. 
119. Id. at 165–66. 
120. Louis Fisher, Judicial Review of the War Power, 35 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 466, 468 (2005) 




123. The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635, 651 (1863). 
124. The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635 (1863). 
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Whether the President in fulfilling his duties, as Commander-in-chief, in 
suppressing an insurrection, has met with such armed hostile resistance, and 
a civil war of such alarming proportions as will compel him to accord to them 
the character of belligerents, is a question to be decided by him, and this Court 
must be governed by the decisions and acts of the political department of the 
Government to which this power was entrusted.  . . .  The proclamation of 
blockade is itself official and conclusive evidence to the Court that a state of 
war existed which demanded and authorized a recourse to such a measure, 
under the circumstances peculiar to the case.125 
To be sure, the facts of the Prize Cases make the opinion inapposite to the 
Paquete Habana.126  Notwithstanding, the dicta expressed in the Prize Cases 
and others had begun to shape the political questions doctrine by the time 
of the Spanish American War.127 
By the joint resolution of 20 April 1898, Congress authorized military 
force to liberate Cuba.128  On 21 April, President McKinley ordered 
Admiral Sampson to blockade Cuba along its northern coast and interdict 
Spanish ships.129  When Congress declared war on 25 April, it expressly 
recognized that a state of war had existed since the 21st.130   
 
125. See id. at 670 (finding the political branches are enabled to “prosecute war with vigor and 
efficiency”) (emphasis omitted). 
126. See ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY 191(2004). 
127. On the point of matters of Commander-in-Chief discretion as not subject to judicial 
review, also consider the case of Durand v. Hollins, 8 F. Cas. 111 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1860) (No. 4186) 
(“The question whether it was the duty of the president to interpose for the protection of the citizens 
at Greytown [in Nicaragua] . . . was a public political question, in which the government, as well as the 
citizens whose interests were involved, was concerned, and which belonged to the executive to 
determine; and his decision is final and conclusive, and justified the defendant in the execution of his 
orders given through the secretary of the navy.”).  Id. at 112.  Durand, a case from the Circuit Court of 
the Southern District of New York, is not a part of the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence.  Still, it was an 
early case that shaped the application of the doctrine in matters of Commander-in-Chief discretion.  
Of note, the author of the opinion in Durand, Samuel Nelson, was an Associate Justice of the Supreme 
Court serving on the circuit court, as was then customary.  See SCHLESINGER JR., supra note 126, at 191 
(discussing Samuel Nelson’s service on the Supreme Court).  Since, like the Paquete Habana, Durand has 
remained a staple of the law concerning war powers, especially within the executive branch.  See JACK 
L. GOLDSMITH III, DEPLOYMENT OF UNITED STATES ARMED FORCES TO HAITI: MEMORANDUM 
OPINION FOR THE COUNSEL TO THE PRESIDENT 2 (Mar. 17, 2004), https://fas.org/irp/ 
agency/doj/olc/haiti.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZZ9Q-YCDD] (citing Durand for support).  
128. Act of Apr. 20, 1898, Pub. L. No. 55-24, 30 Stat. 738 (recognizing the independence of the 
people of Cuba by joint resolution). 
129. The Sinking of Maine, supra note 17. 
130. Id. 
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 As for the rule, when the Court said, “where there is no treaty and no 
controlling executive or legislative act or judicial decision, resort must be 
had to the customs and usages of civilized nations,” it said nothing 
offensive.131  But it misapplied its own rule.132  There was a controlling 
executive act that ordered the blockade and directed the capture of all 
Spanish ships and even neutral ships with men likely to aid the enemy.  
There were controlling legislative acts that authorized the use of military 
force and declared war, a declaration that Congress made retroactive to the 
blockade’s date and, therefore, ratified the President’s measures undertaken 
to effectuate the blockade.133  And there were judicial decisions, not least 
Marbury but also the Prize Cases, establishing political discretion decisions to 
be barred from judicial review.134 
Admiral Sampson’s captures of the two fishing boats were actions 
extending from the Commander-in-Chief’s wartime military discretion and 
were therefore not subject to judicial review.135 
IV.    JUDICIAL REVIEW AND WAR POWERS 
In time of war, the law is silent.136  This maxim, attributed to Cicero, could 
just as well be imputed to Clausewitz or others on war.  It, too, 
oversimplifies.  Law does apply to conduct in wartime.137  But more 
difficult is the answer to the question of which law applies.  Perhaps the 
better principle is, in time of war, the law defers.138  In matters of warfare, the 
political question doctrine is a doctrine not of silence but deference, 
deference to Commander-in-Chief discretion, and the law of war.139   
 
131. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900). 
132. President McKinley’s Proclamation of Blockade to Forsyth, supra note 24. 
133. The Sinking of Maine, supra note 17. 
134. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 170 (1803); The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635 (1863). 
135. President McKinley’s Proclamation of Blockade to Forsyth, supra note 24. 
136. STEPHEN BREYER, THE COURT AND THE WORLD: AMERICAN LAW AND THE NEW 
GLOBAL REALITIES 15 (2015). 
137. Id. at 19. 
138. See id. (“[I]n certain instances, the Constitution gives not to the courts but to other branches 
of government the power to decide whether an action violates the Constitution.  In this way, the laws, 
including the Constitution, do not necessarily fall ‘silent.’  They still apply to the government action in 
question.  But it is for Congress or the President, not the courts, to determine what the law requires 
given the national security threat.”). 
139. The political question doctrine is “more specific and better developed than Cicero’s maxim 
as crisis jurisprudence,” though in some cases, “as applied to questions of national security, it is 
nonetheless in the same spirit.”  See id. (“[B]y walling off many of the President’s wartime and foreign 
affairs decisions from review, it is but one step removed from Cicero.”). 
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Events in the first half of the twentieth century further complicated 
judicial review.  In the famous words of scholar Edward Corwin, the 
Constitution had proved to be “an invitation to struggle for the privilege of 
directing American foreign policy”140 with the Supreme Court as the final 
arbiter of the law of foreign relations.  What has emerged is that 
Commander-in-Chief discretion is not absolute, as the Supreme Court 
intimated in Curtiss-Wright.141  Although the Court in Curtiss-Wight did not 
use the phrase political question, the rationale reveals application of the 
doctrine.142  The same is true for the cases concerning the United States’ 
internment of Japanese-Americans and Youngstown.143 
The Japanese-American internment cases are important because they 
exemplify the struggle for control expressed in Corwin’s aphorism, and 
precisely in the area of Commander-in-Chief wartime military discretion.  
Youngstown is important because it stands out as an example of the federal 
judiciary asserting itself against executive overreach, and again in a matter of 
Commander-in-Chief wartime military discretion.144  
 To be sure, much went wrong in the Japanese Internment cases.145  Still, 
Associate Justice Robert Jackson’s statement in dissent in Korematsu146 is 
unassailable: “In the very nature of things[,] military decisions are not 
 
140. EDWARD S. CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT: OFFICES AND POWERS 1787–1957, at 171 (N.Y. 
Univ. Press 4th ed. 1957) (1940). 
141. See United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319–20 (1936) (“It is 
important to bear in mind that we are here dealing not alone with an authority vested in the President 
by an exertion of legislative power, but with such an authority plus the very delicate, plenary and 
exclusive power of the President as the sole organ of the federal government in the field of international 
relations . . . .”).  This extraneous treatment came to stand for a “vision of unrestrained executive 
discretion.”  KOH, supra note 101, at 112. 
142. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. at 329. 
143. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (The Steel Seizure Case), 343 U.S. 579, 634 
(1952) (discussing the “infirmity of confusing the issue of a power’s validity with the cause it is invoked 
to promote,” in the context of Presidential powers); see BREYER, supra note 136, at 79 (“As to the 
‘political question’ doctrine, as expressed in Curtiss-Wright and Korematsu, the Guantanamo cases did not 
overrule these decisions directly, but it is as if they (and also Steel Seizure [Youngstown]) drained those 
earlier cases of their persuasive force . . . .”). 
144. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 585. 
145. Neal Kumar Katyal, Trump v. Hawaii: How the Supreme Court Simultaneously Overturned and 
Revived Korematsu, 128 YALE L.J.F. 641, 641–42 (2019) (“[T]he Court’s decision in Korematsu has joined 
the ranks of this country’s most notorious antiprecedents—textbook cases of judicial decision-making 
gone wrong that jurists of all stripes vow never to repeat.”); Neal Katyal, Confession of Error:  
The Solicitor General’s Mistakes During the Japanese-American Internment Cases, U.S. DEP’T. OF JUSTICE  
(May 20, 2011), https://www.justice.gov/opa/blog/confession-error-solicitor-generals-mistakes-
during-japanese-american-internment-cases [https://perma.cc/TN9W-38BH]. 
146. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944). 
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susceptible of intelligent judicial appraisal . . . .  Hence courts can never have 
any real alternative to accepting the mere declaration of the authority that 
issued the order that it was reasonably necessary from a military 
viewpoint.”147  Another of Justice Jackson’s opinions, his concurring 
opinion in Youngstown, is of paramount importance on judicial review of war 
powers.148  
A. Commander-in-Chief Discretion and the Twilight Zone 
Youngstown came up during the Korean War.149  Steelworkers threatened 
to strike after talks failed on new collective bargaining agreements.150  
Fearing the impending strike would jeopardize the steel production needed 
for the war, President Truman ordered the Secretary of Commerce to take 
possession of the steel mills and oversee their operation.151  The workers 
brought suit, arguing that the order was beyond the President’s power.152  
The President invoked his authority as Chief Executive and Commander-
in-Chief, characterizing the Korean campaign as a grave emergency that 
necessitated the order.153 
In the end, the Court held against the seizure.154  Justice Hugo Black 
wrote the Court’s opinion.155  Four of the five justices who concurred with 
Justice Black issued separate opinions, each important in its own right, but 
none more important than Justice Jackson’s concurring opinion.156   
In his concurring opinion, Justice Jackson outlined a three-part 
framework of presidential power:  
 
147. Id. at 245. 
148. With experience as Solicitor General, Attorney General, and Chief United States 
Prosecutor on the Nuremburg Trials, it is not surprising that Justice Jackson had much to say on 
judicial review of war powers.  See About the Robert H. Jackson Center, ROBERT H. JACKSON CTR., 
https://www.roberthjackson.org/about/ [https://perma.cc/2AY8-UWDS] (detailing the positions 
Justice Jackson held throughout his career). 




153. Id. at 582. 
154. Id. at 589. 
155. Id. at 582. 
156. See BREYER, supra note 136, at 56 (“Justice Robert Jackson added what history has shown 
to be the most important concurring opinion, in which he set forth an important, now well-known 
analysis dividing presidential action into three categories.”). 
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1. When the President acts pursuant to an express or implied authorization 
of Congress, his authority is at its maximum, for it includes all that he 
possesses in his own right plus all that Congress can delegate. . . . 
2. When the President acts in absence of either a congressional grant or 
denial of authority, he can only rely upon his own independent powers, but 
there is a zone of twilight in which he and Congress may have concurrent 
authority, or in which its distribution is uncertain. . . . 
3. When the President takes measures incompatible with the expressed or 
implied will of Congress, his power is at its lowest ebb, for then he can rely 
only upon his own constitutional powers minus any constitutional powers of 
Congress over the matter.157 
In explaining the scope and limits of presidential power, Justice Jackson 
sought to make clear the import of Curtiss-Wright, so as to refute any residual 
ideas of its endorsement of “unrestrained executive discretion.”  
Justice Jackson emphasized: 
[Curtiss-Wright] recognized internal and external affairs as being in separate 
categories, and held that the strict limitation upon congressional delegations 
of power to the President over internal affairs does not apply with respect to 
delegations of power in external affairs.  It was intimated that the President 
might act in external affairs without congressional authority, but not that he 
might act contrary to an Act of Congress.158 
Thus, it is important to keep in mind that the Japanese-American 
internment cases and Youngstown concerned matters implicating the exercise 
of war powers in internal affairs.  Furthermore, even a cursory review of 
Curtiss-Wright and Korematsu reveals that both cases concerned executive 
function together with congressional approval, either beforehand or after 
the fact.159  Yet when such authority is exercised abroad in wartime under 
the Commander-in-Chief power, judicial review may be had, but only under 
narrow circumstances, and for narrow purposes.  Considering these 
difficulties, what is necessary is a “discriminating analysis.”160 
 
157. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 635–37. 
158. Id. at 636 n.2. 
159. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 215–16 (1944); United States v. Curtiss-Wright 
Exp. Co., 299 U.S. 304, 311 (1936). 
160. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 211–12 (1962). 
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B. Foreign Relations and the Discriminating Analysis 
The case of Baker v. Carr161 is the most important case in shaping the 
political question doctrine, not least because it set out factors the Court 
determined to be relevant in judging whether and to what extent to apply 
it.162  After Baker, in foreign relations and national security cases, courts 
must undertake the appropriate discriminating analysis of the particular 
question posed.  
Associate Justice William Brennan established the Baker framework, such 
that: 
Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political question is 
found [1] a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to 
a coordinate political department; or [2] a lack of judicially discoverable and 
manageable standards for resolving it; or [3] the impossibility of deciding 
without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial 
discretion; or [4] the impossibility of a court’s undertaking independent 
resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of 
government; or [5] an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political 
decision already made; or [6] the potentiality of embarrassment from 
multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one question.163   
Baker factors 1 and 2 have remained intact.164  These two criteria are still 
very much a part of the analysis.165  Factors 3,166 4, 5, and 6 concern the 
 
161. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962). 
162. Id. at 211. 
163. Id. at 217. 
164. But see Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 1002–06 (1979) (laying out rationale on the non-
justiciability of political questions without any mention whatsoever of the Baker factors).  In Goldwater, 
none of the Justices was able to marshal enough support for his views to bring about a majority opinion.  
Justices Stewart & Stevens joined Justice Rehnquist’s opinion, which then constituted the plurality 
view.  Id. at 1002. 
165. See Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1, 10 (1973) (“It would be difficult to think of a clearer 
example of the type of governmental action that was intended by the Constitution to be left to the 
political branches directly responsible—as the Judicial Branch is not—to the electoral process.  
Moreover, it is difficult to conceive of an area of governmental activity in which the courts have less 
competence.  The complex, subtle, and professional decisions as to the composition, training, 
equipping, and control of a military force are essentially professional military judgments, subject always 
to civilian control of the Legislative and Executive Branches.”) (emphasis in original); see also Nixon v. 
United States, 506 U.S. 224, 236 (1993) (“In addition to the textual commitment argument, we are 
persuaded that the lack of finality and the difficulty of fashioning relief counsel against justiciability.”). 
166. Factor 3, the test of the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of 
a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion, seems to suggest that the true nature of the test is whether the 
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prudential features of the doctrine.  Consider Justice Powell’s concurring 
opinion in Goldwater v. Carter,167 which subsumed Baker’s last four factors 
into the issue of whether “prudential considerations counsel against judicial 
intervention.”168 
As for foreign relations, Baker emphasized that “it is error to suppose that 
every case or controversy which touches foreign relations lies beyond 
judicial cognizance.”169  The Court went on to say:  
Our cases in this field seem invariably to show a discriminating analysis of the 
particular question posed, in terms [1] of the history of its management by the 
political branches, [2] of its susceptibility to judicial handling in the light of its 
nature and posture in the specific case, and [3] of the possible consequences 
of judicial action.170  
These are the Baker principles.  
 
issue is yet ripe for review.  That is, if the issue is impossible to decide without an initial policy 
determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion, then, in order for it to be possible for the 
Court to decide the issue, there must first be some policy determination by one or the other of the 
political branches.  This sounds in the principle of ripeness.  See Goldwater, 444 U.S. at 997 (Powell, J., 
concurring) (“This Court has recognized that an issue should not be decided if it is not ripe for judicial 
review.  Prudential considerations persuade me that a dispute between Congress and the President is 
not ready for judicial review unless and until each branch has taken action asserting its constitutional 
authority.”).  Consider also this statement from Justice Sonia Sotomayor’s concurrence in Zivotofsky: 
“[I]t may be appropriate for courts to stay their hand in cases implicating delicate questions concerning 
the distribution of political authority between coordinate branches until a dispute is ripe, intractable, 
and incapable of resolution by the political process.”  Zivotofsky v. Clinton, 566 U.S. 189, 206 (2012) 
(Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
167. Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996 (1979). 
168. Id. at 998. 
169. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 211 (1962). 
170. Id. at 211–12.  A close reading of this wording interprets it as applying to foreign relations 
cases.  But these three factors seem to be just restatements of the two jurisdictional categories plus the 
catch-all prudential category.  And as to the broader political question doctrine, the Court also said: 
Unless one of these formulations is inextricable from the case at bar, there should be no dismissal 
for non-justiciability on the ground of a political question’s presence.  The doctrine of which we 
treat is one of “political questions,” not one of “political cases.”  The courts cannot reject as “no 
law suit” a bona fide controversy as to whether some action denominated “political” exceeds 
constitutional authority.  The cases we have reviewed show the necessity for discriminating inquiry 
into the precise facts and posture of the particular case, and the impossibility of resolution by any 
semantic cataloguing. 
Id. at 217 (emphasis added).  So, whether it is a “discriminating analysis” or “discriminating inquiry,” it 
is always on a case-by-case basis. 
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Now notice that Baker principles 1 and 2 are reformulations of Baker 
factors 1 and 2, and that principle 3 is an amalgam of Baker factors 3 through 
6.  But the Baker principles are more than only reformulations of the Baker 
factors.  They free courts’ rationale from the strictures of the more 
“semantic cataloguing” of the Baker factors in favor of a set of principles 
more faithful to the framework of the Constitution—particularly to the 
separation of powers—and the courts’ role of judicial review in foreign 
relations and national security cases.171 
The first Baker principle is compatible with the Youngstown framework.  
That is, considering the history of the management of the war powers by 
the political branches, it is appropriate to determine if the president’s power 
(as Chief Executive and Commander-in-Chief) is at its maximum, in the 
twilight zone of concurrent authority, or at its lowest ebb.172  Next, under 
the second Baker principle, it is appropriate to consider whether and to what 
extent the precise legal question is susceptible “to judicial handling in the 
light of its nature and posture in the specific case.”173  Finally, consideration 
is appropriate on the possible consequences of judicial action. 
The changing character of war and warfare make the discriminating 
analysis imperative. 
V.    THE DISCRIMINATING ANALYSIS IMPERATIVE 
When historian David Crist wrote his history on the “twilight war” 
between the United States and Iran, he used the twilight metaphor to 
describe the space between war and peace.174  Still, the phrase could just as 
well have alluded to Justice Jackson’s three-part framework.175  As with the 
naval operation implicated in Koohi,176 most military operations occur in 
 
171. Id. at 217. 
172. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635–38 (1952) (Jackson, J., 
concurring). 
173. Baker, 369 U.S. at 211. 
174. DAVID CRIST, THE TWILIGHT WAR: THE SECRET HISTORY OF AMERICA’S THIRTY-
YEAR CONFLICT WITH IRAN 4–5 (2012) (“Twilight is an accurate metaphor for the current state of 
affairs between the United States and Iran. . . .  For three decades, the two nations have been suspended 
between war and peace.”). 
175. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 635–38. 
176. Punctuating the twilight wars was the naval operation at issue in Koohi, operation Earnest 
Will.  Cox, supra note 1.  President Ronald Reagan did not seek congressional authorization for the 
operation.  CASPAR W. WEINBERGER, A REPORT TO THE CONGRESS ON SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS 
IN THE PERSIAN GULF 21 (1987) (“[T]here is no basis at the present time for concluding that the [War 
Powers] Resolution will apply . . . .”).  Weinberger was Secretary of Defense under President Reagan. 
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these two zones of twilight.177  Therefore, resolving the Koohi problem calls 
for an application of Baker’s discriminating analysis of the particular 
question.  Two cases demonstrate the point. 
A. Tarros S.p.A. v. United States 
In 2011, to quell civil unrest in his country, Muammar Qadhafi, dictator 
of Libya, authorized (ordered) the country’s military forces to silence 
protestors.178  Civilians, men and women alike, were to be silenced, even if 
that meant maimed or killed.179  The U.N. Security Council (UNSC) 
unanimously resolved to intervene.180  With Resolutions 1970 and 1973, 
the UNSC instituted, among other measures, an arms embargo on the 
Libyan government.181  The Resolution instructed U.N. member states to 
enforce the embargo and take all necessary measures to protect civilians and 
civilian-populated areas.182  
Under orders of United States President Barack Obama, in March 2011, 
the U.S. initiated Operation Odyssey Dawn to enforce Resolution 1973.183  
On 22 March, U.S. naval warship the USS Stout interdicted, questioned, and 
turned away the Vento—a commercial cargo ship flying the flag of 
Cyprus—as it made its way toward the Libyan coast, bound for Tripoli.184  
At some point, the ship sustained damage.185  The company that contracted 
for the Vento alleged damages due to negligence of the U.S. naval forces.186  
The plaintiff claimed the U.S. naval forces’ actions were contrary to the 
Resolutions, a North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Warning, and 
international maritime law, specifically the United Nations Convention on 
the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).187   
The district court took up the matter on the question of “whether the 
Stout—and by implication, the military—had a duty under international law 
to conduct operations in a specified manner, and acted negligently in the 
 
177. BARBARA SALAZAR TORREON & SOFIA PLAGAKIS, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R42738, 
INSTANCES OF USE OF UNITED STATES ARMED FORCES ABROAD, 1798-2020, at 2 (2020). 
178. Tarros S.p.A. v. United States, 982 F. Supp. 2d 325, 327 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). 
179. Id. 




184. Id. at 329. 
185. Id. at 327. 
186. Id. at 330. 
187. The United States and is not a party to UNCLOS. 
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performance of that duty by blockading and diverting the Vento.”188  The 
district court was careful.  It announced: “It is well established, however, 
that the political question doctrine generally precludes judicial review of 
discretionary military decisions related to military operations.”189  The court 
said “such cases typically implicate Baker’s first two factors.”190  And, in 
applying the first factor, it found that not only does the Constitution commit 
military decisions to the political branches, but “[m]ilitary judgments such 
as these are paradigmatic of discretionary decisions constitutionally 
committed to the Executive Branch.”191   
Citing a Fourth Circuit case from 1991,192 the district court stated 
“adjudication would require the Court to wade into the heart of military 
operations, interjecting tort law into the realm of national security and 
second-guessing judgments . . . that are properly left to the other constituent 
branches of government.”193  The district court also found that there were 
no judicially manageable standards (Baker factor two) on which to judge 
“what would be ‘reasonable’ under the circumstances.”194   
And it is here that the district court confronted the error of the Paquete 
Habana and the Koohi problem: “In the face of ample case law indicating that 
this dispute is not justiciable, Plaintiff cites two cases—the Paquete Habana 
and Koohi v. United States—that allowed tort actions for damages challenging 
military discretion related to military operations.”195  The district court 
explained in the plainest language why the error of the Paquete Habana is of 
little legal consequence: 
While Habana and Koohi add a wrinkle to the analysis in this case, they do not 
change the result.  Habana is inapposite for at least three reasons.  First, 
whereas Congress has expressly granted jurisdiction to federal courts over 
prize causes, . . . no statute or treaty authorizes courts to determine whether 
military actions taken to enforce international obligations such as Resolutions 
1970 and 1973 were justified, and the Court will not read into general statutes 
such as the [Public Vessels Act] and the [Suits in Admiralty Act] jurisdiction 
 
188. Tarros, 982 F. Supp. 2d at 333. 
189. Id. 
190. Id. at 334.  
191. Id. (emphasis added). 
192. Tiffany v. United States, 931 F.2d 271 (4th. Cir. 1991). 
193. Tarros, 982 F. Supp. 2d at 334 (quoting Tiffany v. United States, 931 F.2d 271, 275 (4th Cir. 
1991)) (internal quotations omitted). 
194. Id. at 336. 
195. Id. at 337 (citations omitted). 
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to make such determinations . . . .  Second, in Habana, the Executive 
petitioned the judiciary to review the prize for condemnation.  In contrast, in 
this case the Government is the defendant and contends that the Court lacks 
jurisdiction.  Third, Habana predates Erie, which established that there is no 
federal general common law.  Habana’s reliance upon customary international 
law as a matter of federal general common law to restrain the Executive’s 
military discretion is therefore no longer warranted.196 
The district court did not mention that the Supreme Court in the Paquete 
Habana was sitting as a prize court and so its holding was a narrow one, 
applicable only to prize cases.197  For all these reasons, the Paquete Habana 
should not be of much legal consequence.  Still, the case shows that the 
Paquete Habana, its error notwithstanding, remains of practical consequence. 
In addressing the question presented, the district court in Tarros went on 
to weigh the “Effect of International Law on Military Discretion.”198  
Finding that Resolutions 1970 and 1973 and the NATO Warning were not 
self-executing such as to create domestically enforceable legal rights, the 
district court then turned to the application of UNCLOS.199   
The United States had not (and has not) ratified UNCLOS, so, as the 
court explained: “To the extent that Plaintiff invokes UNCLOS, the Court 
understands it to argue—and assumes arguendo—that the Convention’s 
provisions are reflective of customary international law and, therefore, 
would inform the standard of care by which the military is bound.”200  With 
restraint, the district court said: “In light of the Court’s conclusion that this 
case presents a political question, UNCLOS is irrelevant.”201  This point is 
worth repeating.  Customary international law is irrelevant to whether a 
matter presents a nonjusticiable political question.  
If a case or controversy should bring the Supreme Court to overturn the 
Paquete Habana, the Court would do well to take a page—or all of them—
from Tarros.  But Tarros is a district court case.  Without appellate 
endorsement, Tarros is far from having settled the issue of the non-
justiciability of matters of Commander-in-Chief discretion in federal courts.  
 
196. Tarros, 982 F. Supp. 2d at 337–38 (citations omitted).  The court’s third listed reason is 
significant but beyond the scope of this Article. 
197. Sweeney, supra note 105, at 483. 
198. Tarros, 982 F. Supp. 2d at 339. 
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The issue came up again in 2015 in the Fourth Circuit case of Wu Tien Li-
Shou v. United States.202  
B. Wu Tien Li-Shou v. United States 
In 2010, Somali pirates raided and commandeered a Taiwanese fishing 
vessel—the Jin Chun Tsai 68 (JCT 68)—and held it and its men hostage, 
including Wu Lai-Yu, the owner and master, and two Chinese crewmen.203  
In 2011, a NATO task force came under orders to “shadow and then disrupt 
the pirate mothership JCT 68.”204  On 10 May 2011, the warship USS 
Groves confronted the JCT 68 and ordered the pirates to surrender on the 
order of the task force commander.  The pirates refused to comply, and an 
hour-long firefight ensued.205  When the men boarded the vessel, they 
found Master Wu shot dead.206   
Years later, Master Wu’s widow, Wu Tien Li-Shou, sued for wrongful 
death and negligent destruction of property under several federal 
statutes.207  The district court and the Fourth Circuit dismissed for lack of 
subject-matter jurisdiction, having determined that the matter presented a 
nonjusticiable political question.208   
The district court based its holding on the determination that the alleged 
negligence that caused the death of Master Wu and the destruction of the 
ship arose from an operation by a U.S. naval vessel in “an act of 
belligerency,” and the “[t]he Navy sank the JCT 68 under direct orders from 
the allied commander of the NATO-led operation.”209  The district court 
emphasized the following facts: 
It is alleged in the complaint, and for purposes of the pending motion it is 
assumed to be true, that (1) when the USS Groves fired the shots that killed 
Master [Wu Lai-]Yu,210 it positioned itself beyond the firing range of the 
 
202. Wu Tien Li-Shou v. United States, 777 F.3d 175 (4th Cir. 2015). 
203. Id. at 179. 
204. Id.  In 2009, NATO initiated Operation Ocean Shield to combat piracy in the Gulf of 
Aden and around the Horn of Africa.  Id. 
205. Id. at 179. 
206. Id. 
207. The Public Vessels Act, the Suits in Admiralty Act, and the Death on the High Seas Act. 
208. Wu Tien Li-Shou, 777 F.3d at 178. 
209. Wu Tien Li-Shou v. United States, 997 F. Supp. 2d 307, 309–10 (D. Md. 2014). 
210. The District Court referred to the decedent as “Yu,” which is in fact his first (given) name, 
and only part of it.  It is a custom of Chinese and Taiwanese culture to put the family name (surname) 
first.  So, Tien Li-Shou carries her married name Wu, and the deceased is properly referred to by his 
family name Wu. 
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pirates’ weapons, (2) the shots that were fired hit the JCT 68 on the starboard 
[right-hand] side of the ship, well aft [back] of the bow [front], and (3) the 
USS Groves used exploding ordnance [artillery] rather than inert ordnance as 
would have been appropriate.211 
After determining that the matter presented a nonjusticiable political 
question, the Fourth Circuit addressed domestic sovereign immunity.  The 
following passage deserves highlight: 
Wu also challenges the district court’s holding that the United States retains 
its sovereign immunity from suit because it was engaged in the exercise of a 
discretionary function.  While this is framed as an alternative ground for 
decision, it decidedly is not because the political question doctrine and the 
discretionary function exception to waivers of sovereign immunity overlap 
here in important respects.212 
But while “Wu insist[ed] that the USS Groves acted in contravention of 
law and thus that the government [could not] claim the discretionary 
function exception as a safe harbor, . . .  Wu [still did] not identify a law that 
would permissibly have circumscribed the USS Groves’s course of 
action.”213  In the end, the Fourth Circuit emphasized: “The [Suits in 
Admiralty Act] and the [Public Vessels Act] both waive sovereign immunity 
for in personam admiralty suits,” but that, “[n]either statute contains an 
explicit exception to the scope of its waiver.”214  The Fourth Circuit 
nevertheless applied the discretionary function exception to the Acts.215  
The Supreme Court declined review in October 2015.216 
The current realities of warfare call for some revisions to the law of 
justiciability and domestic sovereign immunity.  Specifically, the appellate 
jurisdiction of the U.S. Supreme Court and the original and appellate 
jurisdiction of the federal courts should be expressly limited to exclude 
matters of wartime military discretion and Commander-in-Chief discretion.  
Also, the combatant immunities and discretionary function exceptions in 
the Federal Tort Claims Act should be expressed across all legislative 
 
211. Wu Tien Li-Shou, 997 F. Supp. 2d at 309.  
212. Wu Tien Li-Shou, 777 F.3d at 183. 
213. Id. at 185 (citation omitted). 
214. Id. at 183–84. 
215. Id. at 184. 
216. Li-Shou v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 139 (2015). 
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enactments that waive the sovereign immunity of the U.S. Government and 
its agents acting under lawful orders. 
VI.    CONCLUSION 
The error of the Paquete Habana is that the Supreme Court failed to 
recognize that the case concerned a matter of wartime military discretion.217  
On the Admiral’s orders, the fishing boats’ captured crewmen were to be 
detained as prisoners of war, the ships to be taken to the army garrison at 
Key West.218  This implicated the military necessity exception to the rule 
that exempted coastal fishing boats from capture as prize.219  Yet, the Court 
applied the rule without applying the exception.220  As a result, the Court’s 
inference that the Admiral violated higher orders was wrong.  According to 
the joint resolution authorizing the use of military force and the Declaration 
of War, a state of war had existed since the 21st of April.221  In addition, 
the President’s and the Admiral’s rules of engagement expressed that the 
war was to be conducted in harmony with international law and applicable 
customary norms.  Thus, the Admiral’s judgment that the crewmen were 
likely to aid the enemy was an extension of the Commander-in-Chief’s 
wartime military discretion. 
The Koohi proposition carried forward the Paquete Habana error by 
asserting matters of Commander-in-Chief discretion are subject to judicial 
review.  This proposition threatens to have a chilling effect on military 
operations.  Resolving the Koohi problem requires a discriminating analysis 
of the particular question posed.  In matters of warfare, the political question 
doctrine calls for the courts to defer to Commander-in-Chief discretion and 
the law of war. 
 
217. Koohi v. United States, 976 F.2d 1328, 1332 (9th Cir. 1992). 
218. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 713 (1900). 
219. Id. at 718. 
220. See generally id. 
221. Id. at 712. 
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